Windows Process Creation: Suspicious SetupComplete.cmd execution for CVE-2019-1378 exploitation

Alerts on cmd.exe parent command lines executing SetupComplete.cmd or PartnerSetupComplete.cmd from Windows Setup script paths.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v5

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2019-11-15
Updated: 2026-07-31

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.003Windows Command Shell
- T1574Hijack Execution Flow
Persistence
- T1574Hijack Execution Flow
Priv Esc
- T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- T1574Hijack Execution Flow
Defense Evasion
- T1574Hijack Execution Flow
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows process creation events where the parent command line invokes cmd.exe via /c and includes scripts under C:\Windows\Setup\Scripts\, ending with SetupComplete.cmd or PartnerSetupComplete.cmd. This behavior matters because those script entry points are associated with a privilege escalation exploitation path for CVE-2019-1378. The detection relies on process creation telemetry that includes parent command line details and the child process image path for exclusions.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Process Creation: Suspicious SetupComplete.cmd execution for CVE-2019-1378 exploitation

Pivot detection · T1068 · 9 related

Changelog

v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-process-creation-suspicious-setupcomplete-cmd-partnersetupcomplete-cmd-e-1c373b6d

title: "Windows Process Creation: Suspicious SetupComplete.cmd execution for CVE-2019-1378 exploitation"
id: 092b2a1f-c5c9-42da-9b96-5ff79382897e
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creation events where the parent command line invokes cmd.exe via /c and includes scripts under C:\Windows\Setup\Scripts\, ending with SetupComplete.cmd or PartnerSetupComplete.cmd. This behavior matters because those script entry points are associated with a privilege escalation exploitation path for CVE-2019-1378. The detection relies on process creation telemetry that includes parent command line details and the child process image path for exclusions.
references:
  - https://web.archive.org/web/20200530031708/https://www.embercybersecurity.com/blog/cve-2019-1378-exploiting-an-access-control-privilege-escalation-vulnerability-in-windows-10-update-assistant-wua
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2019/Exploits/CVE-2019-1378/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2019_1378.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Huntrule Team
date: 2019-11-15
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1068
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.003
  - attack.t1574
  - cve.2019-1378
  - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
      - \cmd.exe
      - /c
      - C:\Windows\Setup\Scripts\
    ParentCommandLine|endswith:
      - SetupComplete.cmd
      - PartnerSetupComplete.cmd
  filter:
    Image|startswith:
      - C:\Windows\System32\
      - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\
      - C:\Windows\WinSxS\
      - C:\Windows\Setup\
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 1c373b6d-76ce-4553-997d-8c1da9a6b5f5
    type: derived

Convert

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