Windows Process Creation: Sysinternals PsService (PsService*.exe) Execution

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1543.003Windows Service
Priv Esc
- T1543.003Windows Service
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags process creation events where the executable name corresponds to Sysinternals PsService variants (psservice.exe and PsService*.exe). Attackers may use PsService to perform service-oriented discovery or to prepare for tampering as part of broader privilege escalation or persistence efforts. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry, matching the process image/original filename. Legitimate administrative use can also trigger the alert.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Process Creation: Sysinternals PsService (PsService*.exe) Execution

Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-process-creation-sysinternals-psservice-psservice-exe-execution-3371f518

title: "Windows Process Creation: Sysinternals PsService (PsService*.exe) Execution"
id: cdf01bc6-e7fb-4a37-8f8e-11ca75cb168d
status: test
description: This rule flags process creation events where the executable name corresponds to Sysinternals PsService variants (psservice.exe and PsService*.exe). Attackers may use PsService to perform service-oriented discovery or to prepare for tampering as part of broader privilege escalation or persistence efforts. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry, matching the process image/original filename. Legitimate administrative use can also trigger the alert.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psservice
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sysinternals_psservice.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-06-16
modified: 2026-06-29
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    - OriginalFileName: psservice.exe
    - Image|endswith:
        - \PsService.exe
        - \PsService64.exe
        - \PsService64a.exe
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate use of PsService by an administrator
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 3371f518-5fe3-4cf6-a14b-2a0ae3fd8a4f
    type: derived

Convert

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