Windows Portable Gpg.exe Execution from Uncommon Paths
Flags gpg.exe/gpg2.exe launched from non-standard locations on Windows, based on process creation path and executable metadata.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2023-08-06
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
ImpactRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
What it detects
This rule flags process creation events where an executable named gpg.exe (or gpg2.exe) is launched from a location other than common installed program directories. Attackers may use portable GnuPG binaries to encrypt or decrypt data during staging, impact, or loader workflows. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry, specifically the process image path ending in gpg.exe/gpg2.exe and the OriginalFileName and Description metadata used to identify GnuPG.
Reporting behind it
- trendmicro.comhttps://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/vn/threat-encyclopedia/malware/ransom.bat.zarlock.a
- securelist.comhttps://securelist.com/locked-out/68960/
- github.comhttps://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/c4097dc7ed14d7f7d08c89d148c4307097e8c294/atomics/T1486/T1486.md
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_gpg4win_portable_execution.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows Portable Gpg.exe Execution from Uncommon Paths
id: 9fb4c5c3-4658-4d36-97f1-49138fa134e6
status: test
description: This rule flags process creation events where an executable named gpg.exe (or gpg2.exe) is launched from a location other than common installed program directories. Attackers may use portable GnuPG binaries to encrypt or decrypt data during staging, impact, or loader workflows. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry, specifically the process image path ending in gpg.exe/gpg2.exe and the OriginalFileName and Description metadata used to identify GnuPG.
references:
- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/vn/threat-encyclopedia/malware/ransom.bat.zarlock.a
- https://securelist.com/locked-out/68960/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/c4097dc7ed14d7f7d08c89d148c4307097e8c294/atomics/T1486/T1486.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_gpg4win_portable_execution.yml
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2023-08-06
modified: 2023-11-10
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1486
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Image|endswith:
- \gpg.exe
- \gpg2.exe
- OriginalFileName: gpg.exe
- Description: GnuPG’s OpenPGP tool
filter_main_legit_location:
Image|contains:
- :\Program Files (x86)\GNU\GnuPG\bin\
- :\Program Files (x86)\GnuPG VS-Desktop\
- :\Program Files (x86)\GnuPG\bin\
- :\Program Files (x86)\Gpg4win\bin\
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 77df53a5-1d78-4f32-bc5a-0e7465bd8f41
type: derived