Windows Process Execution from Unusual System Locations
Alerts on Windows process launches where the executable path is in or contains unusual directories like RECYCLER or SystemVolumeInformation.
FreeUnreviewedSigmamediumv1
windows-process-execution-from-unusual-system-locations-15b75071
title: Windows Process Execution from Unusual System Locations
id: 97a284f6-5dcd-4889-8fd8-f7b0a3fc067e
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creations where the executable path appears to start in or under uncommon directories such as C:\Windows\Tasks\ or C:\Windows\debug\, and where it contains C:\\RECYCLER\\ or C:\\SystemVolumeInformation\\. Attackers often use atypical locations to evade casual inspection and blend execution into less-monitored areas. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, specifically the Image path field, checking both prefix patterns and substring matches.
references:
- https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-05-002
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_run_locations.yml
author: juju4, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community, Huntrule Team
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2022-01-07
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036
- car.2013-05-002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Image|contains:
- :\RECYCLER\
- :\SystemVolumeInformation\
- Image|startswith:
- C:\Windows\Tasks\
- C:\Windows\debug\
- C:\Windows\fonts\
- C:\Windows\help\
- C:\Windows\drivers\
- C:\Windows\addins\
- C:\Windows\cursors\
- C:\Windows\system32\tasks\
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 15b75071-74cc-47e0-b4c6-b43744a62a2b
type: derived
What it detects
This rule flags Windows process creations where the executable path appears to start in or under uncommon directories such as C:\Windows\Tasks\ or C:\Windows\debug\, and where it contains C:\\RECYCLER\\ or C:\\SystemVolumeInformation\\. Attackers often use atypical locations to evade casual inspection and blend execution into less-monitored areas. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, specifically the Image path field, checking both prefix patterns and substring matches.
Known false positives
- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.