Windows Process Execution from Unusual System Locations

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1036Masquerading
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows process creations where the executable path appears to start in or under uncommon directories such as C:\Windows\Tasks\ or C:\Windows\debug\, and where it contains C:\\RECYCLER\\ or C:\\SystemVolumeInformation\\. Attackers often use atypical locations to evade casual inspection and blend execution into less-monitored areas. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, specifically the Image path field, checking both prefix patterns and substring matches.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Process Execution from Unusual System Locations

Pivot detection · T1036 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-process-execution-from-unusual-system-locations-15b75071

title: Windows Process Execution from Unusual System Locations
id: 97a284f6-5dcd-4889-8fd8-f7b0a3fc067e
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creations where the executable path appears to start in or under uncommon directories such as C:\Windows\Tasks\ or C:\Windows\debug\, and where it contains C:\\RECYCLER\\ or C:\\SystemVolumeInformation\\. Attackers often use atypical locations to evade casual inspection and blend execution into less-monitored areas. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, specifically the Image path field, checking both prefix patterns and substring matches.
references:
  - https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-05-002
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_run_locations.yml
author: juju4, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community, Huntrule Team
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2022-01-07
tags:
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1036
  - car.2013-05-002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    - Image|contains:
        - :\RECYCLER\
        - :\SystemVolumeInformation\
    - Image|startswith:
        - C:\Windows\Tasks\
        - C:\Windows\debug\
        - C:\Windows\fonts\
        - C:\Windows\help\
        - C:\Windows\drivers\
        - C:\Windows\addins\
        - C:\Windows\cursors\
        - C:\Windows\system32\tasks\
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 15b75071-74cc-47e0-b4c6-b43744a62a2b
    type: derived

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