Windows Process Creation: Suspicious GUP.exe Execution from Non-Notepad++ Directories

Alerts on GUP.exe executions from unexpected directories on Windows, excluding known Notepad++ updater paths.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2019-02-06
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1574.001DLL
Persistence
- T1574.001DLL
Priv Esc
- T1574.001DLL
Defense Evasion
- T1574.001DLL
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags process execution events where the image name ends with GUP.exe but the binary is not located in the expected Notepad++ updater paths. Attackers may use this pattern to run a payload disguised as or leveraging GUP.exe, including scenarios involving DLL side-loading from unexpected directories. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry, specifically the executable path and filename reported in the Image field.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Process Creation: Suspicious GUP.exe Execution from Non-Notepad++ Directories

Pivot detection · T1574.001 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-process-execution-of-gup-exe-outside-notepad-updater-paths-0a4f6091

title: "Windows Process Creation: Suspicious GUP.exe Execution from Non-Notepad++ Directories"
id: 13f78edb-ac69-44a5-b13b-9dad1999cd11
status: test
description: This rule flags process execution events where the image name ends with GUP.exe but the binary is not located in the expected Notepad++ updater paths. Attackers may use this pattern to run a payload disguised as or leveraging GUP.exe, including scenarios involving DLL side-loading from unexpected directories. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry, specifically the executable path and filename reported in the Image field.
references:
  - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/09/apt10-targeting-japanese-corporations-using-updated-ttps.html
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_gup_suspicious_execution.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2019-02-06
modified: 2022-08-13
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.execution
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith: \GUP.exe
  filter_programfiles:
    Image|endswith:
      - \Program Files\Notepad++\updater\GUP.exe
      - \Program Files (x86)\Notepad++\updater\GUP.exe
  filter_user:
    Image|contains: \Users\
    Image|endswith:
      - \AppData\Local\Notepad++\updater\GUP.exe
      - \AppData\Roaming\Notepad++\updater\GUP.exe
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
  - Execution of tools named GUP.exe and located in folders different than Notepad++\updater
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 0a4f6091-223b-41f6-8743-f322ec84930b
    type: derived

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