Windows Process Execution of Regasm/Regsvcs from Uncommon Directories

Alerts on Regasm/Regsvcs executions from commonly abused non-standard directories using process creation image and command line fields.

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2022-08-25
Updated
2026-07-30

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule flags process creations where Regasm.exe or Regsvcs.exe is executed from specific, potentially suspicious directory paths (e.g., Temp, Startup, PerfLogs, Users\Public, and Windows Temp). Attackers may use these Windows registration utilities to execute or stage components in a way that blends into normal system behavior. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry containing the image name and the full command line for directory/path context.

Related detections9 linkedT1218.009 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious Outbound Connection From CasPol Binary
Suspicious Assembly Execution via Regasm or Regsvcs From a User Path (via process_creation)
Suspicious CasPol Execution Spawned by PowerShell for Injection
Suspicious PowerShell Spawning .NET LOLBIN (via process_creation)
RegAsm.exe Process Execution Missing Command-Line and Assembly Path (Windows)
Windows RegAsm.exe Initiates Network Connection to Public IP
Windows Process Execution of Regasm/Regsvcs from Uncommon Directories
Pivot detection · T1218.009 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.