Windows Process Execution via WorkFolders.exe Launching control.exe

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1218System Binary Proxy Execution
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags process creation where WorkFolders.exe is the parent process and it spawns control.exe. An attacker could abuse this relationship to execute a system utility with a chosen control.exe instance, blending execution into legitimate Windows binaries. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, specifically parent and child process image paths, and matches when the child is a control.exe path that does not equal the standard C:\Windows\System32\control.exe.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Process Execution via WorkFolders.exe Launching control.exe

Pivot detection · T1218 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-process-execution-via-workfolders-exe-launching-control-exe-0bbc6369

title: Windows Process Execution via WorkFolders.exe Launching control.exe
id: eb253c91-7f9b-4192-bae3-c68622164179
status: test
description: This rule flags process creation where WorkFolders.exe is the parent process and it spawns control.exe. An attacker could abuse this relationship to execute a system utility with a chosen control.exe instance, blending execution into legitimate Windows binaries. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, specifically parent and child process image paths, and matches when the child is a control.exe path that does not equal the standard C:\Windows\System32\control.exe.
references:
  - https://twitter.com/elliotkillick/status/1449812843772227588
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_workfolders.yml
author: Maxime Thiebaut (@0xThiebaut), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-10-21
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1218
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith: \control.exe
    ParentImage|endswith: \WorkFolders.exe
  filter:
    Image: C:\Windows\System32\control.exe
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate usage of the uncommon Windows Work Folders feature.
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 0bbc6369-43e3-453d-9944-cae58821c173
    type: derived

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