Windows: File creation of a Procmon-named .sys driver by non-procmon processes

Alerts when a procmon-named .sys driver is created by a process other than procmon.

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v2

Product: windows
Category: file_event
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2023-05-05
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags creation of a driver file (.sys) whose name contains "\procmon" and ends with .sys when the creating process is not one of the known Procmon executables. Attackers may drop or create drivers for persistence or privilege escalation while disguising the artifact using Procmon-like naming. It relies on Windows file creation events, capturing the target filename and the creating process image name for exclusion.

Reporting behind it

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Windows: File creation of a Procmon-named .sys driver by non-procmon processes

Pivot detection · T1068 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-process-monitor-driver-sys-created-by-non-procmon-executables-a05baa88

title: "Windows: File creation of a Procmon-named .sys driver by non-procmon processes"
id: 1d5fb565-3aab-4dda-a6de-0c273b5d670b
status: test
description: This rule flags creation of a driver file (.sys) whose name contains "\procmon" and ends with .sys when the creating process is not one of the known Procmon executables. Attackers may drop or create drivers for persistence or privilege escalation while disguising the artifact using Procmon-like naming. It relies on Windows file creation events, capturing the target filename and the creating process image name for exclusion.
references:
  - Internal Research
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_sysinternals_procmon_driver_susp_creation.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2023-05-05
modified: 2026-06-29
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1068
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: file_event
detection:
  selection:
    TargetFilename|contains: \procmon
    TargetFilename|endswith: .sys
  filter_main_process_explorer:
    Image|endswith:
      - \procmon.exe
      - \procmon64.exe
      - \procmon64a.exe
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
  - Some false positives may occur with legitimate renamed process monitor binaries
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: a05baa88-e922-4001-bc4d-8738135f27de
    type: derived

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