Windows HackTool Process Patterns for CrackMapExec LSASS Dumping

Alerts on Windows command-line process patterns consistent with LSASS dumping in CrackMapExec workflows.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2022-03-12
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
- T1003.001LSASS Memory
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows process creation events whose command lines and user strings match patterns associated with credential-access tooling attempting to dump LSASS. It matters because attackers often use LSASS memory contents to obtain credential material. The detection relies on telemetry containing process command lines and process execution context, such as command-line arguments invoking tasklist/cmd and use of rundll32 with comsvcs.dll MiniDump, plus checks for temporary-path and output patterns.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1003.001 — drag to rearrange

Malicious Mimikatz Credential Dumping via Command Line Arguments

Malicious Credential Extraction via Volatility Memory Analysis (via process_creation)

Suspicious Physical Memory Acquisition via WinPmem (via process_creation)

Malicious LSASS Credential Dump via Rundll32 Comsvcs MiniDump via Process Creation (via process_creation)

Suspicious LSASS Credential Access via PowerShell (via process_creation)

Suspicious LSASS Memory Dump via Task Manager After Ivanti Exploitation

Suspicious ProcDump LSASS Memory Dump via process_creation

Malicious Mimikatz Credential Dump Log File Creation (via file_event)

Malicious WDigest UseLogonCredential Enabled for Cleartext Credential Theft (via registry_set)

Windows HackTool Process Patterns for CrackMapExec LSASS Dumping

Pivot detection · T1003.001 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-process-pattern-indicating-crackmapexec-lsass-dumping-via-tasklist-cmd-a-f26307d8

title: Windows HackTool Process Patterns for CrackMapExec LSASS Dumping
id: aabd8db8-f013-42aa-8796-42b7220c941e
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creation events whose command lines and user strings match patterns associated with credential-access tooling attempting to dump LSASS. It matters because attackers often use LSASS memory contents to obtain credential material. The detection relies on telemetry containing process command lines and process execution context, such as command-line arguments invoking tasklist/cmd and use of rundll32 with comsvcs.dll MiniDump, plus checks for temporary-path and output patterns.
references:
  - https://mpgn.gitbook.io/crackmapexec/smb-protocol/obtaining-credentials/dump-lsass
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_crackmapexec_patterns.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-03-12
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection_lsass_dump1:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - "tasklist /fi "
      - Imagename eq lsass.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
      - "cmd.exe /c "
      - "cmd.exe /r "
      - "cmd.exe /k "
      - "cmd /c "
      - "cmd /r "
      - "cmd /k "
    User|contains:
      - AUTHORI
      - AUTORI
  selection_lsass_dump2:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - do rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump
      - \Windows\Temp\
      - " full"
      - "%%B"
  selection_procdump:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - tasklist /v /fo csv
      - findstr /i "lsass"
  condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: f26307d8-14cd-47e3-a26b-4b4769f24af6
    type: derived

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