Windows Process: RazerInstaller Explorer Subprocess with System Integrity Level
Flags explorer.exe spawned by RazerInstaller.exe when the installer runs at System/high integrity.
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windows-process-razerinstaller-explorer-subprocess-with-system-integrity-level-a4eaf250
title: "Windows Process: RazerInstaller Explorer Subprocess with System Integrity Level"
id: f3e04317-b83a-4c09-914e-a84dd9b89624
status: test
description: This rule identifies explorer.exe child processes spawned by RazerInstaller.exe while the parent runs with high integrity (System or S-1-16-16384). Such behavior matters because an installer-created explorer subprocess can be abused to enable privilege escalation and defense-impairment scenarios. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry capturing parent-child relationships, image paths, and integrity level.
references:
- https://twitter.com/j0nh4t/status/1429049506021138437
- https://streamable.com/q2dsji
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2021/Exploits/RazerInstaller-LPE-Exploit/proc_creation_win_exploit_other_razorinstaller_lpe.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Maxime Thiebaut, Huntrule Team
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1553
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: \RazerInstaller.exe
IntegrityLevel:
- System
- S-1-16-16384
filter_main_razer:
Image|startswith: C:\Windows\Installer\Razer\Installer\
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- User selecting a different installation folder (check for other sub processes of this explorer.exe process)
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: a4eaf250-7dc1-4842-862a-5e71cd59a167
type: derived
What it detects
This rule identifies explorer.exe child processes spawned by RazerInstaller.exe while the parent runs with high integrity (System or S-1-16-16384). Such behavior matters because an installer-created explorer subprocess can be abused to enable privilege escalation and defense-impairment scenarios. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry capturing parent-child relationships, image paths, and integrity level.
Known false positives
- User selecting a different installation folder (check for other sub processes of this explorer.exe process)
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.