Windows: Suspicious explorer.exe Child Process Spawned by RazerInstaller.exe
Flags explorer.exe spawned by RazerInstaller.exe when the installer runs at System/high integrity.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Maxime Thiebaut (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2021-08-23
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags the creation of an explorer.exe subprocess when the parent process is RazerInstaller.exe and the parent runs with System integrity. Such subprocess spawning from an installer may be abused to perform actions under elevated context, which attackers can leverage during privilege escalation or defense-impairment. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry, including parent image paths, child image paths, and integrity level values.
Reporting behind it
Changelog
v5- v5Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v4Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v3Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows: Suspicious explorer.exe Child Process Spawned by RazerInstaller.exe"
id: f3e04317-b83a-4c09-914e-a84dd9b89624
status: test
description: This rule flags the creation of an explorer.exe subprocess when the parent process is RazerInstaller.exe and the parent runs with System integrity. Such subprocess spawning from an installer may be abused to perform actions under elevated context, which attackers can leverage during privilege escalation or defense-impairment. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry, including parent image paths, child image paths, and integrity level values.
references:
- https://twitter.com/j0nh4t/status/1429049506021138437
- https://streamable.com/q2dsji
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2021/Exploits/RazerInstaller-LPE-Exploit/proc_creation_win_exploit_other_razorinstaller_lpe.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Maxime Thiebaut, Huntrule Team
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1553
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: \RazerInstaller.exe
IntegrityLevel:
- System
- S-1-16-16384
filter_main_razer:
Image|startswith: C:\Windows\Installer\Razer\Installer\
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- User selecting a different installation folder (check for other sub processes of this explorer.exe process)
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: a4eaf250-7dc1-4842-862a-5e71cd59a167
type: derived