Windows Provisioning Registry Key Abuse Leading to Indirect Execution via Provlaunch.exe

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1218System Binary Proxy Execution
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags process creation events where the command line contains the provisioning commands registry path 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\'. Abuse of this location can enable indirect command execution through Provlaunch.exe, helping attackers run additional payloads while blending into legitimate provisioning-related activity. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry with access to the full command line string.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Provisioning Registry Key Abuse Leading to Indirect Execution via Provlaunch.exe

Pivot detection · T1218 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-provisioning-registry-key-abuse-leading-to-indirect-execution-via-provla-2a4b3e61

title: Windows Provisioning Registry Key Abuse Leading to Indirect Execution via Provlaunch.exe
id: 9b3bbd82-9750-4cbe-aa77-a77923f0fca3
related:
  - id: 7f5d1c9a-3e83-48df-95a7-2b98aae6c13c
    type: similar
  - id: f9999590-1f94-4a34-a91e-951e47bedefd
    type: similar
  - id: 7021255e-5db3-4946-a8b9-0ba7a4644a69
    type: similar
  - id: 2a4b3e61-9d22-4e4a-b60f-6e8f0cde6f25
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags process creation events where the command line contains the provisioning commands registry path 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\'. Abuse of this location can enable indirect command execution through Provlaunch.exe, helping attackers run additional payloads while blending into legitimate provisioning-related activity. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry with access to the full command line string.
references:
  - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Provlaunch/
  - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1674399582162153472
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_registry_provlaunch_provisioning_command.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Huntrule Team
date: 2023-08-08
tags:
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1218
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    CommandLine|contains: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1

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