Windows Process Proxying: explorer.exe Spawned from cmd.exe or PowerShell

Flags cmd.exe/powershell.exe launching explorer.exe, indicating possible proxy-based execution on Windows.

FreeReviewedSigma · Low · v5

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Furkan CALISKAN, @caliskanfurkan_, @oscd_initiative (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2020-10-05
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1218System Binary Proxy Execution
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags process creation events where a shell host such as cmd.exe or PowerShell spawns explorer.exe. Proxying execution through explorer.exe can help attackers blend in with normal user processes or evade monitoring by launching payloads via a trusted GUI executable. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry including parent image, child image, and the child command line.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Process Proxying: explorer.exe Spawned from cmd.exe or PowerShell

Pivot detection · T1218 · 9 related

Changelog

v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-proxy-execution-explorer-exe-spawned-by-cmd-exe-or-powershell-9eb271b9

title: "Windows Process Proxying: explorer.exe Spawned from cmd.exe or PowerShell"
id: efbbd8c5-84c9-41b2-aecb-2a8d9b3258e3
status: test
description: This rule flags process creation events where a shell host such as cmd.exe or PowerShell spawns explorer.exe. Proxying execution through explorer.exe can help attackers blend in with normal user processes or evade monitoring by launching payloads via a trusted GUI executable. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry including parent image, child image, and the child command line.
references:
  - https://twitter.com/CyberRaiju/status/1273597319322058752
  - https://app.any.run/tasks/9a8fd563-4c54-4d0a-9ad8-1fe08339cbc3/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_explorer_child_of_shell_process.yml
author: Furkan CALISKAN, @caliskanfurkan_, @oscd_initiative, Huntrule Team
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2024-06-21
tags:
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1218
  - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - \cmd.exe
      - \powershell.exe
      - \pwsh.exe
    Image|endswith: \explorer.exe
    CommandLine|contains: explorer.exe
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate explorer.exe run from a shell host like "cmd.exe" or "powershell.exe"
level: low
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 9eb271b9-24ae-4cd4-9465-19cfc1047f3e
    type: derived

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