Windows Register_app.vbs Proxy COM+ Provider Registration via Process Command-Line

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1218System Binary Proxy Execution
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags process executions whose command line contains both the script path segment '\register_app.vbs' and the '-register' argument, indicating an attempt to register a COM+ application/provider using Microsoft signed script content. Attackers can use COM+ registration behavior for stealthy proxying or execution flows that blend with legitimate system tooling. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry that captures the full command line.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Register_app.vbs Proxy COM+ Provider Registration via Process Command-Line

Pivot detection · T1218 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-register-app-vbs-vss-vds-com-provider-registration-via-register-1c8774a0

title: Windows Register_app.vbs Proxy COM+ Provider Registration via Process Command-Line
id: 5f2b2b73-715f-40ca-ab0d-f518c5382b2a
status: test
description: This rule flags process executions whose command line contains both the script path segment '\register_app.vbs' and the '-register' argument, indicating an attempt to register a COM+ application/provider using Microsoft signed script content. Attackers can use COM+ registration behavior for stealthy proxying or execution flows that blend with legitimate system tooling. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry that captures the full command line.
references:
  - https://twitter.com/sblmsrsn/status/1456613494783160325?s=20
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_register_app.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-08-19
tags:
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1218
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - \register_app.vbs
      - -register
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate usage of the script. Always investigate what's being registered to confirm if it's benign
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 1c8774a0-44d4-4db0-91f8-e792359c70bd
    type: derived

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