Windows DNS Queries Initiated by Regsvr32.exe

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1559.001Component Object Model
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1218.010Regsvr32
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags DNS query activity where the initiating process image path ends with \regsvr32.exe. Attackers may misuse regsvr32.exe to blend into legitimate Windows execution while generating outbound name resolution. The detection relies on DNS query telemetry that includes the requesting process image associated with the DNS event.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1218.010 — drag to rearrange

Windows Regsvr32.exe Initiated Network Connection

Malicious Regsvr32 Loading Masqueraded VPN DLL via Process Creation

Malicious Regsvr32 ShellExec_RunDLL Proxy Execution (via process_creation)

Suspicious DLL Execution via Regsvr32 DllInstall of dat File

Malicious Xctdoor XcLoader Execution via Regsvr32 AppX Path Abuse (via process_creation)

Malicious Office Application Loading a User-Path DLL via Regsvr32 or Rundll32 (via process_creation)

Masquerading SSLoad PhantomLoader DLL Execution via Regsvr32 Silent Load from AppData (via process_creation)

Malicious Kimsuky AlphaSeed Payload Execution via Regsvr32 Loading edge dat (via process_creation)

Malicious Regsvr32 Executing DLL From Windows Temp

Windows DNS Queries Initiated by Regsvr32.exe

Pivot detection · T1218.010 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-regsvr32-exe-dns-queries-detected-36e037c4

title: Windows DNS Queries Initiated by Regsvr32.exe
id: 0faac4bb-e366-434a-b4b1-dd9a73a372d7
related:
  - id: c7e91a02-d771-4a6d-a700-42587e0b1095
    type: derived
  - id: 36e037c4-c228-4866-b6a3-48eb292b9955
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags DNS query activity where the initiating process image path ends with \regsvr32.exe. Attackers may misuse regsvr32.exe to blend into legitimate Windows execution while generating outbound name resolution. The detection relies on DNS query telemetry that includes the requesting process image associated with the DNS event.
references:
  - https://pentestlab.blog/2017/05/11/applocker-bypass-regsvr32/
  - https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_regsvr32_dns_query.yml
author: Dmitriy Lifanov, oscd.community, Huntrule Team
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2023-09-18
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1559.001
  - attack.t1218.010
logsource:
  category: dns_query
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith: \regsvr32.exe
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1

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