Windows: Rundll32 Executing Registered COM Local Servers via Command-Line { }

Flags rundll32.exe launching COM local servers using -sta/-localserver with braced arguments.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
frack113 (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2022-02-13
Updated
2026-07-30

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule matches process executions of rundll32.exe where the command line includes COM local server startup flags (-sta and -localserver) and contains a braced argument ({ ... }). Attackers can use rundll32 to load functionality indirectly through registered COM objects, which can aid persistence and privilege escalation. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry fields for Image/OriginalFileName and command-line content.

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Windows: Rundll32 Executing Registered COM Local Servers via Command-Line { }
Pivot detection · T1546.015 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.