Windows: Rundll32 LaunchApplication via pcwutl.dll

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1218.011Rundll32
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies process creation where rundll32.exe is invoked to call the LaunchApplication function from pcwutl.dll. Attackers may use this DLL-based execution path to stealthily launch executables through trusted system binaries. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry, matching rundll32.exe invocation details and command-line arguments referencing pcwutl and LaunchApplication.

Reporting behind it

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Windows: Rundll32 LaunchApplication via pcwutl.dll

Pivot detection · T1218.011 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-rundll32-launchapplication-execution-via-pcwutl-dll-9386d78a

title: "Windows: Rundll32 LaunchApplication via pcwutl.dll"
id: 68779d10-61a7-4892-998f-cbc9b8cc9f9e
status: test
description: This rule identifies process creation where rundll32.exe is invoked to call the LaunchApplication function from pcwutl.dll. Attackers may use this DLL-based execution path to stealthily launch executables through trusted system binaries. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry, matching rundll32.exe invocation details and command-line arguments referencing pcwutl and LaunchApplication.
references:
  - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Pcwutl/
  - https://twitter.com/harr0ey/status/989617817849876488
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_pcwutl.yml
author: Julia Fomina, oscd.community, Huntrule Team
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2023-02-09
tags:
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1218.011
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe
    - OriginalFileName: RUNDLL32.EXE
  selection_cli:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - pcwutl
      - LaunchApplication
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Use of Program Compatibility Troubleshooter Helper
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 9386d78a-7207-4048-9c9f-a93a7c2d1c05
    type: derived

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