Windows: rundll32 Shell32 Control_RunDLL Execution of User Temp .CPL
Detects rundll32 Shell32 Control_RunDLL launching a .CPL from user Temp, a stealthy execution path.
FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
windows-rundll32-shell32-control-rundll-execution-of-user-temp-cpl-92020b88
title: "Windows: rundll32 Shell32 Control_RunDLL Execution of User Temp .CPL"
id: 69230b75-901e-45a5-9264-0761aa888d87
status: test
description: This rule flags process creation where rundll32.exe (or OriginalFileName RUNDLL32.EXE) invokes Shell32.dll Control_RunDLL to load a .CPL file from the current user’s AppData\Local\Temp directory. Attackers may use this mechanism to execute code in a way that blends into legitimate Windows component behavior, relying on .CPL control panel module loading. The detection is based on parent and process image names ending with rundll32/control.exe and on command-line indicators for Shell32.dll, Control_RunDLL, and a .CPL path under Temp.
references:
- https://tria.ge/240226-fhbe7sdc39/behavioral1
- https://bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/signature/RaspberryRobin/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2024/Malware/Raspberry-Robin/proc_creation_win_malware_raspberry_robin_rundll32_shell32_cpl_exection.yml
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Huntrule Team
date: 2024-03-07
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218.011
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent_img:
ParentImage|endswith:
- \rundll32.exe
- \control.exe
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe
- OriginalFileName: RUNDLL32.EXE
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- shell32.dll
- Control_RunDLL
- .CPL
selection_path:
CommandLine|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 92020b88-9caf-464f-bad8-cd0fb0aa2a81
type: derived
What it detects
This rule flags process creation where rundll32.exe (or OriginalFileName RUNDLL32.EXE) invokes Shell32.dll Control_RunDLL to load a .CPL file from the current user’s AppData\Local\Temp directory. Attackers may use this mechanism to execute code in a way that blends into legitimate Windows component behavior, relying on .CPL control panel module loading. The detection is based on parent and process image names ending with rundll32/control.exe and on command-line indicators for Shell32.dll, Control_RunDLL, and a .CPL path under Temp.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.