Windows Process Creation: rundll32 Shell32 Control_RunDLL Executes .CPL from User Temp

Detects rundll32 Shell32 Control_RunDLL launching a .CPL from user Temp, a stealthy execution path.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v5

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2024-03-07
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1218.011Rundll32
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies Windows process creation where rundll32 is launched with Shell32.dll Control_RunDLL to load a .CPL file from the user temp directory. Attackers commonly use Control_RunDLL to execute installer/control panel payloads while blending into normal Windows component usage. The detection relies on telemetry from process creation, including parent and executable image paths and command-line content such as Shell32.dll, Control_RunDLL, and a .CPL file under AppData\Local\Temp.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1218.011 — drag to rearrange

Malicious Lunar Spider Loader Execution via rundll32 (via process_creation)

Malicious SYSTEM Persistence via Scheduled Task Running rundll32 at Startup (via process_creation)

Malicious Rundll32 Executing Image File as DLL

Suspicious Scheduled Task Executing Rundll32 DLL Export by Ordinal

Malicious Renamed Rundll32 Copied to Temp via Xcopy

Suspicious rundll32 Executing DLL from ProgramData (via process_creation)

Suspicious Rundll32 Loading DLL From Public or ProgramData Path via Process Creation (via process_creation)

Malicious LSASS Credential Dump via Rundll32 Comsvcs MiniDump via Process Creation (via process_creation)

Suspicious Rundll32 Execution Without a DLL Reference via Process Creation (via process_creation)

Windows Process Creation: rundll32 Shell32 Control_RunDLL Executes .CPL from User Temp

Pivot detection · T1218.011 · 9 related

Changelog

v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-rundll32-shell32-control-rundll-execution-of-user-temp-cpl-92020b88

title: "Windows Process Creation: rundll32 Shell32 Control_RunDLL Executes .CPL from User Temp"
id: 69230b75-901e-45a5-9264-0761aa888d87
status: test
description: This rule identifies Windows process creation where rundll32 is launched with Shell32.dll Control_RunDLL to load a .CPL file from the user temp directory. Attackers commonly use Control_RunDLL to execute installer/control panel payloads while blending into normal Windows component usage. The detection relies on telemetry from process creation, including parent and executable image paths and command-line content such as Shell32.dll, Control_RunDLL, and a .CPL file under AppData\Local\Temp.
references:
  - https://tria.ge/240226-fhbe7sdc39/behavioral1
  - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/signature/RaspberryRobin/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2024/Malware/Raspberry-Robin/proc_creation_win_malware_raspberry_robin_rundll32_shell32_cpl_exection.yml
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Huntrule Team
date: 2024-03-07
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1218.011
  - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent_img:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - \rundll32.exe
      - \control.exe
  selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe
    - OriginalFileName: RUNDLL32.EXE
  selection_cli:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - shell32.dll
      - Control_RunDLL
      - .CPL
  selection_path:
    CommandLine|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 92020b88-9caf-464f-bad8-cd0fb0aa2a81
    type: derived

Convert

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SplunkSPL