Windows Process Creation: rundll32 Shell32 Control_RunDLL Executes .CPL from User Temp

Detects rundll32 Shell32 Control_RunDLL launching a .CPL from user Temp, a stealthy execution path.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v5

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2024-03-07
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1218.011Rundll32
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies Windows process creation where rundll32 is launched with Shell32.dll Control_RunDLL to load a .CPL file from the user temp directory. Attackers commonly use Control_RunDLL to execute installer/control panel payloads while blending into normal Windows component usage. The detection relies on telemetry from process creation, including parent and executable image paths and command-line content such as Shell32.dll, Control_RunDLL, and a .CPL file under AppData\Local\Temp.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1218.011 — drag to rearrange

Malicious Zardoor Backdoor Execution via rundll32 (via process_creation)

Malicious Rundll32 Loading an Export From a User Path (via process_creation)

Renamed Regsvr32 or Rundll32 Loading a DLL With a Non-Standard Extension (via process_creation)

Malicious Rundll32 DllRegisterServer Execution From a User-Writable Path (via process_creation)

IMEEX Framework DLL Execution via Rundll32 Loading imaadp (via process_creation)

Suspicious Persistence via pcalua Launching rundll32 Control_RunDLL

Suspicious Rundll32 Executing DLL Start Export With Control Flags

Suspicious Rundll32 Execution of Timestamp-Named DLL

Suspicious Rundll32 Loading DLL from LocalAppData with Short Export (via process_creation)

Windows Process Creation: rundll32 Shell32 Control_RunDLL Executes .CPL from User Temp

Pivot detection · T1218.011 · 9 related

Changelog

v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-rundll32-shell32-control-rundll-execution-of-user-temp-cpl-92020b88

title: "Windows Process Creation: rundll32 Shell32 Control_RunDLL Executes .CPL from User Temp"
id: 69230b75-901e-45a5-9264-0761aa888d87
status: test
description: This rule identifies Windows process creation where rundll32 is launched with Shell32.dll Control_RunDLL to load a .CPL file from the user temp directory. Attackers commonly use Control_RunDLL to execute installer/control panel payloads while blending into normal Windows component usage. The detection relies on telemetry from process creation, including parent and executable image paths and command-line content such as Shell32.dll, Control_RunDLL, and a .CPL file under AppData\Local\Temp.
references:
  - https://tria.ge/240226-fhbe7sdc39/behavioral1
  - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/signature/RaspberryRobin/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2024/Malware/Raspberry-Robin/proc_creation_win_malware_raspberry_robin_rundll32_shell32_cpl_exection.yml
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Huntrule Team
date: 2024-03-07
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1218.011
  - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent_img:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - \rundll32.exe
      - \control.exe
  selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe
    - OriginalFileName: RUNDLL32.EXE
  selection_cli:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - shell32.dll
      - Control_RunDLL
      - .CPL
  selection_path:
    CommandLine|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 92020b88-9caf-464f-bad8-cd0fb0aa2a81
    type: derived

Convert

This rule as a query you can run. Uses no unlock credit.

SplunkSPL