Windows scheduled task creation via schtasks.exe from suspicious parent path
Flags schtasks.exe /Create when spawned from temp or user-writable parent directories on Windows.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-02-23
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Execution → Priv EscRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags process creation where schtasks.exe is launched with /Create and the parent process image path contains common writable or user-controlled locations such as Temp and AppData. Attackers often use this pattern to establish persistence by creating scheduled tasks from environments likely to host dropped payloads. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry, including parent image paths, the executed image name, and command-line arguments.
Reporting behind it
Changelog
v5- v5Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v4Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v3Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows scheduled task creation via schtasks.exe from suspicious parent path
id: 02c8c25c-d040-4cca-9d8f-4eb760977e67
status: test
description: This rule flags process creation where schtasks.exe is launched with /Create and the parent process image path contains common writable or user-controlled locations such as Temp and AppData. Attackers often use this pattern to establish persistence by creating scheduled tasks from environments likely to host dropped payloads. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry, including parent image paths, the executed image name, and command-line arguments.
references:
- https://app.any.run/tasks/649e7b46-9bec-4d05-98a5-dfa9a13eaae5/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_creation_from_susp_parent.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-02-23
modified: 2024-05-13
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1053.005
- detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|contains:
- :\Temp\
- \AppData\Local\
- \AppData\Roaming\
- \Temporary Internet
- \Users\Public\
- \Windows\Temp\
Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe
CommandLine|contains: "/Create "
filter_optional_common:
CommandLine|contains:
- update_task.xml
- unattended.ini
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Software installers that run from temporary folders and also install scheduled tasks
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 9494479d-d994-40bf-a8b1-eea890237021
type: derived