Windows Scheduled Task Process Run from Suspicious File Locations
Alerts on Windows Task Scheduler process creation when the executed program runs from temp, downloads, desktop, or public-writable paths.
- Product
- windows
- Service
- taskscheduler
- Author
- Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-12-05
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Execution → Priv EscRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows Scheduled Task process executions when the task’s program path contains common user-writable or temporary directories (for example, C:\Windows\Temp\, C:\Temp\, and user profile AppData\Local\Temp\). Attackers often abuse Task Scheduler to persistently execute malicious binaries or scripts from locations that are easier to stage or hide. It relies on Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler operational telemetry for the scheduled task process creation event (EventID 129) and matches the program path substrings.
Reporting behind it
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows Scheduled Task Process Run from Suspicious File Locations
id: 55bbe7f1-f95d-492e-a666-1b3133a8dfe9
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows Scheduled Task process executions when the task’s program path contains common user-writable or temporary directories (for example, C:\Windows\Temp\, C:\Temp\, and user profile AppData\Local\Temp\). Attackers often abuse Task Scheduler to persistently execute malicious binaries or scripts from locations that are easier to stage or hide. It relies on Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler operational telemetry for the scheduled task process creation event (EventID 129) and matches the program path substrings.
references:
- Internal Research
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/taskscheduler/win_taskscheduler_execution_from_susp_locations.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-12-05
modified: 2023-02-07
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1053.005
logsource:
product: windows
service: taskscheduler
definition: 'Requirements: The "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" is disabled by default and needs to be enabled in order for this detection to trigger'
detection:
selection:
EventID: 129
Path|contains:
- C:\Windows\Temp\
- \AppData\Local\Temp\
- \Desktop\
- \Downloads\
- \Users\Public\
- C:\Temp\
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 424273ea-7cf8-43a6-b712-375f925e481f
type: derived