Windows ScreenConnect RMM System Command Execution via cmd.exe
Flags cmd.exe launched by ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe with a TEMP\ScreenConnect command-line path.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Ali Alwashali (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2023-10-10
- Updated
- 2026-07-30
ATT&CK techniques
ExecutionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule detects Windows process creation where ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe launches cmd.exe (or cmd.exe by name) and the command line includes a TEMP folder path containing "ScreenConnect". Attackers may use ScreenConnect to execute arbitrary commands on remote endpoints under the guise of legitimate remote management. The detection relies on process creation telemetry capturing the parent image, the child image/original filename, and the command-line string.
Reporting behind it
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows ScreenConnect RMM System Command Execution via cmd.exe
id: 2b35521c-1d9f-437a-aa02-193467a139e2
status: test
description: This rule detects Windows process creation where ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe launches cmd.exe (or cmd.exe by name) and the command line includes a TEMP folder path containing "ScreenConnect". Attackers may use ScreenConnect to execute arbitrary commands on remote endpoints under the guise of legitimate remote management. The detection relies on process creation telemetry capturing the parent image, the child image/original filename, and the command-line string.
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/pull/4467
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_remote_access_tools_screenconnect_remote_execution.yml
author: Ali Alwashali, Huntrule Team
date: 2023-10-10
modified: 2024-02-26
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: \ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: \cmd.exe
- OriginalFileName: Cmd.Exe
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains: \TEMP\ScreenConnect\
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of ScreenConnect. Disable this rule if ScreenConnect is heavily used.
level: low
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: b1f73849-6329-4069-bc8f-78a604bb8b23
type: derived