Windows Shell/Scripting Tool File Write to Suspicious Directories

Alert on file writes by common Windows shells/scripting tools to C:\PerfLogs, C:\Users\Public, or C:\Windows\Temp.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2

Product: windows
Category: file_event
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2021-11-20
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags file events where common Windows shells and scripting tools (bash, cmd, cscript, powershell, pwsh, sh, wscript, msbuild) or related script execution utilities (certutil, forfiles, mshta, schtasks, scriptrunner, wmic) write to targeted “suspicious” locations. Such activity can indicate staging, payload preparation, or other persistence-related file drops using legitimate interpreters and execution binaries. It relies on Windows file event telemetry that includes the process image path and the target filename written to PerfLogs, Users\Public, or Windows\Temp.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Shell/Scripting Tool File Write to Suspicious Directories

Pivot detection · T1059 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-scripting-binaries-writing-files-to-suspicious-directories-1277f594

title: Windows Shell/Scripting Tool File Write to Suspicious Directories
id: e101da0b-8587-454b-b54a-bc1add48d366
status: test
description: This rule flags file events where common Windows shells and scripting tools (bash, cmd, cscript, powershell, pwsh, sh, wscript, msbuild) or related script execution utilities (certutil, forfiles, mshta, schtasks, scriptrunner, wmic) write to targeted “suspicious” locations. Such activity can indicate staging, payload preparation, or other persistence-related file drops using legitimate interpreters and execution binaries. It relies on Windows file event telemetry that includes the process image path and the target filename written to PerfLogs, Users\Public, or Windows\Temp.
references:
  - Internal Research
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_shell_write_susp_directory.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-11-20
modified: 2023-03-29
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059
logsource:
  category: file_event
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_1:
    Image|endswith:
      - \bash.exe
      - \cmd.exe
      - \cscript.exe
      - \msbuild.exe
      - \powershell.exe
      - \pwsh.exe
      - \sh.exe
      - \wscript.exe
    TargetFilename|startswith:
      - C:\PerfLogs\
      - C:\Users\Public\
  selection_2:
    Image|endswith:
      - \certutil.exe
      - \forfiles.exe
      - \mshta.exe
      - \schtasks.exe
      - \scriptrunner.exe
      - \wmic.exe
    TargetFilename|contains:
      - C:\PerfLogs\
      - C:\Users\Public\
      - C:\Windows\Temp\
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
    type: derived

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