Windows Security 4624 Logon Type 3: Anonymous local IP (RottenPotato-like) pattern
Alerts on Windows 4624 LogonType 3 with ANONYMOUS LOGON and loopback IPs, matching RottenPotato-like patterns.
FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
windows-security-4624-logon-type-3-anonymous-local-ip-rottenpotato-like-pattern-16f5d8ca
title: "Windows Security 4624 Logon Type 3: Anonymous local IP (RottenPotato-like) pattern"
id: ffaf95b1-2b2a-43a2-b051-13ae53cb70bd
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows Security logon events (EventID 4624) with LogonType 3 where the TargetUserName is "ANONYMOUS LOGON" and the workstation is "-". It further requires the source IP to be local loopback addresses (127.0.0.1 or ::1), a combination commonly seen in RottenPotato-like behaviors. This matters because such local, anomalous authentication patterns can indicate attempted credential access and privilege escalation, and it relies on Windows Security audit telemetry fields for event ID, logon type, target user, workstation name, and source IP.
references:
- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1195284233729777665
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/account_management/win_security_susp_rottenpotato.yml
author: "@SBousseaden, Florian Roth, Huntrule Team"
date: 2019-11-15
modified: 2022-12-22
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1557.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4624
LogonType: 3
TargetUserName: ANONYMOUS LOGON
WorkstationName: "-"
IpAddress:
- 127.0.0.1
- ::1
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 16f5d8ca-44bd-47c8-acbe-6fc95a16c12f
type: derived
What it detects
This rule flags Windows Security logon events (EventID 4624) with LogonType 3 where the TargetUserName is "ANONYMOUS LOGON" and the workstation is "-". It further requires the source IP to be local loopback addresses (127.0.0.1 or ::1), a combination commonly seen in RottenPotato-like behaviors. This matters because such local, anomalous authentication patterns can indicate attempted credential access and privilege escalation, and it relies on Windows Security audit telemetry fields for event ID, logon type, target user, workstation name, and source IP.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.