Windows Security: AD object replication attempted by non-machine account (Event ID 4662)
Alerts on AD replication-related object access events where the requester is not a machine account.
- Product
- windows
- Service
- security
- Author
- Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2019-07-26
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Cred AccessRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule identifies Windows Security events (4662) where access rights associated with Active Directory replication are requested using a non-machine account. An attacker could abuse replication permissions to obtain directory data that may help with credential access or further compromise. It relies on telemetry from Event ID 4662, including the access mask value and the object type GUIDs, and it excludes machine and MSOL account patterns from the subject username.
Reporting behind it
- threathunterplaybook.comhttps://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/180815-ADObjectAccessReplication/notebook.html
- threathunterplaybook.comhttps://threathunterplaybook.com/library/windows/active_directory_replication.html
- threathunterplaybook.comhttps://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190101-ADModDirectoryReplication/notebook.html
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_ad_replication_non_machine_account.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows Security: AD object replication attempted by non-machine account (Event ID 4662)"
id: 55ac56ea-144d-4eff-b941-1b2993cd1ff4
status: test
description: This rule identifies Windows Security events (4662) where access rights associated with Active Directory replication are requested using a non-machine account. An attacker could abuse replication permissions to obtain directory data that may help with credential access or further compromise. It relies on telemetry from Event ID 4662, including the access mask value and the object type GUIDs, and it excludes machine and MSOL account patterns from the subject username.
references:
- https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/180815-ADObjectAccessReplication/notebook.html
- https://threathunterplaybook.com/library/windows/active_directory_replication.html
- https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190101-ADModDirectoryReplication/notebook.html
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_ad_replication_non_machine_account.yml
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Huntrule Team
date: 2019-07-26
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.006
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4662
AccessMask: "0x100"
Properties|contains:
- 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2
- 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2
- 89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c
filter:
- SubjectUserName|endswith: $
- SubjectUserName|startswith: MSOL_
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 17d619c1-e020-4347-957e-1d1207455c93
type: derived