Windows Security: Local Administrators Group Membership Change (Event 4732)
Flags Windows Event 4732 where a user is added to the local Administrators group.
- Product
- windows
- Service
- security
- Author
- Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2017-03-14
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Initial Access → Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule identifies when a new member is added to the local Administrators group by matching Windows Security Event ID 4732 with the target group SID S-1-5-32-544. Such changes can be legitimate, but they may also indicate privilege escalation or persistence by granting elevated local access to a new account. It relies on Windows Security auditing telemetry that records group membership modifications and the involved subject and target fields.
Reporting behind it
- learn.microsoft.comhttps://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4732
- learn.microsoft.comhttps://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-identifiers
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_user_added_to_local_administrators.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows Security: Local Administrators Group Membership Change (Event 4732)"
id: 32c56d3f-429f-491f-9f5b-b3ddeb1c92cb
status: stable
description: This rule identifies when a new member is added to the local Administrators group by matching Windows Security Event ID 4732 with the target group SID S-1-5-32-544. Such changes can be legitimate, but they may also indicate privilege escalation or persistence by granting elevated local access to a new account. It relies on Windows Security auditing telemetry that records group membership modifications and the involved subject and target fields.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4732
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-identifiers
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_user_added_to_local_administrators.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2017-03-14
modified: 2021-01-17
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection_eid:
EventID: 4732
selection_group:
- TargetUserName|startswith: Administr
- TargetSid: S-1-5-32-544
filter_main_computer_accounts:
SubjectUserName|endswith: $
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative activity
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: c265cf08-3f99-46c1-8d59-328247057d57
type: derived