Windows Local User Creation (Security Event 4720)

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1136.001Local Account
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows Security Event ID 4720, which indicates creation of a new local user account. Attackers may use local accounts to establish persistence when they can write credentials or create identities outside centralized domain controls. Detection relies on Security log telemetry from Windows where event 4720 is recorded. Benign cases include activity on domain controllers and account management performed by approved privileged tools.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1136.001 — drag to rearrange

Suspicious Local Account Creation via Net User in Pre-Ransomware Phase

Suspicious Hidden Local Account Creation via Net User by UAT-8099

Malicious Local Account Creation of Support or Whiteninja via net.exe

Malicious Dynamicweb Unauthenticated Administrator Creation via Setup Default.aspx (via webserver)

Suspicious Hidden Backdoor Account Creation Ending With Dollar Sign (via process_creation)

Malicious User Creation via Commandline (via process_creation)

Suspicious Local Account Creation and Privileged Group Addition via Net.EXE (via process_creation)

Suspicious Hidden Local Account Creation via Dscl (via process_creation)

Suspicious Local Account Creation on Linux (via process_creation)

Windows Local User Creation (Security Event 4720)

Pivot detection · T1136.001 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-security-detect-local-user-creation-event-id-4720-66b6be3d

title: Windows Local User Creation (Security Event 4720)
id: 5566d69c-c29b-49eb-b681-332bff940c29
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows Security Event ID 4720, which indicates creation of a new local user account. Attackers may use local accounts to establish persistence when they can write credentials or create identities outside centralized domain controls. Detection relies on Security log telemetry from Windows where event 4720 is recorded. Benign cases include activity on domain controllers and account management performed by approved privileged tools.
references:
  - https://patrick-bareiss.com/detecting-local-user-creation-in-ad-with-sigma/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_user_creation.yml
author: Patrick Bareiss, Huntrule Team
date: 2019-04-18
modified: 2021-01-17
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1136.001
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4720
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Domain Controller Logs
  - Local accounts managed by privileged account management tools
level: low
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 66b6be3d-55d0-4f47-9855-d69df21740ea
    type: derived

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