Windows EDRSilencer Execution via Filtering Platform FilterName Change

ATT&CK techniques

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies execution of the EDRSilencer tool by looking for Windows Security audit events related to Filtering Platform policy changes, where the filter name contains "Custom Outbound Filter". Attackers can use WFP abuse to impair endpoint defenses by blocking outbound traffic from running EDR agents. Detection relies on Windows Security log events (EventID 5441 and 5447) and the presence of matching filter name telemetry in those events.

Reporting behind it

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Windows EDRSilencer Execution via Filtering Platform FilterName Change

Pivot detection · T1685 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-security-edrsilencer-execution-via-filtering-platform-filter-added-98054878

title: Windows EDRSilencer Execution via Filtering Platform FilterName Change
id: bb0454db-75b6-4aba-80da-801996bfd4ee
status: test
description: This rule identifies execution of the EDRSilencer tool by looking for Windows Security audit events related to Filtering Platform policy changes, where the filter name contains "Custom Outbound Filter". Attackers can use WFP abuse to impair endpoint defenses by blocking outbound traffic from running EDR agents. Detection relies on Windows Security log events (EventID 5441 and 5447) and the presence of matching filter name telemetry in those events.
references:
  - https://github.com/netero1010/EDRSilencer
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_hktl_edr_silencer.yml
author: Thodoris Polyzos (@SmoothDeploy), Huntrule Team
date: 2024-01-29
modified: 2024-01-30
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1685
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
  definition: "Requirements: Audit Filtering Platform Policy Change needs to be enabled"
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 5441
      - 5447
    FilterName|contains: Custom Outbound Filter
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 98054878-5eab-434c-85d4-72d4e5a3361b
    type: derived

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