Windows Security: Detects SAM User/Group Access During Domain Recon (Event ID 4661)

Alerts on Event ID 4661 accesses to SAM user/group objects for domain Administrator and Domain Admins.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2

Product: windows
Service: security
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jack Croock (method), Jonhnathan Ribeiro (improvements), oscd.community (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2017-03-07
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
- T1069.002Domain Groups
- T1087.002Domain Account
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows Security Event ID 4661 accesses with AccessMask 0x2d to SAM_USER and SAM_GROUP objects. It matches SAM object names in the domain SID range that end with well-known relative identifiers for the built-in Administrator and Domain Admins groups. Such queries can indicate reconnaissance aimed at enumerating privileged accounts and group membership, relying on advanced auditing visibility for SAM access events in security logs.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1069.002 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious Group Discovery - Command (via process_creation)

SharpHound Host Enumeration Over Kerberos (via security)

Suspicious Active Directory Enumeration via ADWS PowerShell Cmdlets via ps_script

Windows File Events: ADExplorer .dat Snapshot Written by ADExp.exe or ADExplorer.exe

Windows: Sysinternals ADExplorer invoked with snapshot flag to create AD database snapshot

Windows Process Creation: Sysinternals ADExplorer Snapshot Exports Active Directory Database

Windows PowerShell module commandlet names matching known exploitation and post-exploitation tooling

Windows Process Creation: Suspicious PowerShell Commandlets Used by Known Exploitation Tools

Windows Security: Detects SAM User/Group Access During Domain Recon (Event ID 4661)

Pivot detection · T1069.002 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-security-event-4661-sam-object-access-domain-administrator-group-recon-968eef52

title: "Windows Security: Detects SAM User/Group Access During Domain Recon (Event ID 4661)"
id: d93d0808-49eb-4fe7-aece-d3e37dd51d6b
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows Security Event ID 4661 accesses with AccessMask 0x2d to SAM_USER and SAM_GROUP objects. It matches SAM object names in the domain SID range that end with well-known relative identifiers for the built-in Administrator and Domain Admins groups. Such queries can indicate reconnaissance aimed at enumerating privileged accounts and group membership, relying on advanced auditing visibility for SAM access events in security logs.
references:
  - https://findingbad.blogspot.de/2017/01/hunting-what-does-it-look-like.html
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_net_recon_activity.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jack Croock (method), Jonhnathan Ribeiro (improvements), oscd.community, Huntrule Team
date: 2017-03-07
modified: 2022-08-22
tags:
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1087.002
  - attack.t1069.002
  - attack.s0039
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
  definition: The volume of Event ID 4661 is high on Domain Controllers and therefore "Audit SAM" and "Audit Kernel Object" advanced audit policy settings are not configured in the recommendations for server systems
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4661
    AccessMask: "0x2d"
    ObjectType:
      - SAM_USER
      - SAM_GROUP
    ObjectName|startswith: S-1-5-21-
    ObjectName|endswith:
      - "-500"
      - "-512"
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Administrator activity
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 968eef52-9cff-4454-8992-1e74b9cbad6c
    type: derived

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