Windows Sysmon Operational Channel Reference Deleted via Security Event

Detects Security log events showing Sysmon Operational channel being disabled via channel reference deletion-like changes.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2

Product: windows
Service: security
Author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2020-07-14
Updated: 2026-07-31

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1112Modify Registry
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1112Modify Registry
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies attempts to disable the Sysmon Operational channel by changing an event channel value from Enabled to 0 and by observing related registry access. Attackers may impair defenses by muting or disabling Sysmon to reduce visibility into their activity. The detection relies on Windows Security logs (Event IDs 4657 and 4663) capturing object name/value updates and access attempts for the Sysmon event channel identifiers.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1112 — drag to rearrange

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Malicious Service DLL Hijack for Persistence via Lotus Blossom

Suspicious Loopback Proxy Server Configured via Registry (via registry_set)

Malicious WDigest Credential Caching Enabled via Registry (via registry_set)

Suspicious Remote Desktop Enabled via fDenyTSConnections Registry by Sandworm

Malicious Gh0stBins RAT Registry Marker HHClient

Suspicious PebbleDash C2 Configuration Stored Under WMI Security Key (via registry_set)

Suspicious WDigest UseLogonCredential Enablement for Plaintext Credential Theft (via registry_set)

Windows Sysmon Operational Channel Reference Deleted via Security Event

Pivot detection · T1112 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-security-event-alerts-on-sysmon-channel-reference-deletion-18beca67

title: Windows Sysmon Operational Channel Reference Deleted via Security Event
id: 51d5b0b5-b47f-443c-a55d-8373efa25fb6
status: test
description: This rule identifies attempts to disable the Sysmon Operational channel by changing an event channel value from Enabled to 0 and by observing related registry access. Attackers may impair defenses by muting or disabling Sysmon to reduce visibility into their activity. The detection relies on Windows Security logs (Event IDs 4657 and 4663) capturing object name/value updates and access attempts for the Sysmon event channel identifiers.
references:
  - https://twitter.com/Flangvik/status/1283054508084473861
  - https://twitter.com/SecurityJosh/status/1283027365770276866
  - https://securityjosh.github.io/2020/04/23/Mute-Sysmon.html
  - https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/cf08c38c61f7e46e8404b38201ca01c8
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_sysmon_channel_reference_deletion.yml
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), Huntrule Team
date: 2020-07-14
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1112
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection1:
    EventID: 4657
    ObjectName|contains:
      - WINEVT\Publishers\{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}
      - WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
    ObjectValueName: Enabled
    NewValue: 0
  selection2:
    EventID: 4663
    ObjectName|contains:
      - WINEVT\Publishers\{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}
      - WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
    AccessMask: "0x10000"
  condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 18beca67-ab3e-4ee3-ba7a-a46ca8d7d0cc
    type: derived

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