Windows Security 4661 Detects Privileged AD User/Group SID Enumeration via SAM

Identifies SAM_USER/SAM_GROUP access events (4661) aimed at privileged SIDs or names containing 'admin' while ignoring computer accounts.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2

Product: windows
Service: security
Author: Samir Bousseaden (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2019-04-03
Updated: 2026-07-31

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
- T1087.002Domain Account
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows Security events (EventID 4661) involving SAM_USER or SAM_GROUP objects whose names match common privileged account patterns (e.g., containing "admin" or ending with well-known privileged RID suffixes). Attackers often enumerate privileged users and groups to plan escalation and lateral movement, so monitoring these object access attempts helps surface early reconnaissance. It relies on Security log telemetry including ObjectType, ObjectName, EventID, and SubjectUserName for filtering out machine accounts.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1087.002 — drag to rearrange

Suspicious Active Directory Reconnaissance via ADExplorer or ADRecon (via process_creation)

Suspicious Service Principal Name Enumeration via Setspn by UAT-8837

Malicious Active Directory Enumeration via SharpHound or BloodHound (via process_creation)

Suspicious Group Discovery - Command (via process_creation)

SharpHound Host Enumeration Over Kerberos (via security)

SPN Enumeration Previous to Kerberoasting Attack - Native Commands (via process_creation)

Suspicious Active Directory Enumeration via AD Explorer Snapshot Process Creation

Malicious Account Added to Domain Admins Group via net Command

Suspicious Remote Connection to ADWS Port 9389 via security

Windows Security 4661 Detects Privileged AD User/Group SID Enumeration via SAM

Pivot detection · T1087.002 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-security-privileged-user-group-sid-reconnaissance-via-sam-auditing-4661-35ba1d85

title: Windows Security 4661 Detects Privileged AD User/Group SID Enumeration via SAM
id: b9b3d3f0-88cf-4c07-9181-ee76b4465cff
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows Security events (EventID 4661) involving SAM_USER or SAM_GROUP objects whose names match common privileged account patterns (e.g., containing "admin" or ending with well-known privileged RID suffixes). Attackers often enumerate privileged users and groups to plan escalation and lateral movement, so monitoring these object access attempts helps surface early reconnaissance. It relies on Security log telemetry including ObjectType, ObjectName, EventID, and SubjectUserName for filtering out machine accounts.
references:
  - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329163438/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-5-detecting-enumeration.html
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_account_discovery.yml
author: Samir Bousseaden, Huntrule Team
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2022-07-13
tags:
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1087.002
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
  definition: "Requirements: enable Object Access SAM on your Domain Controllers"
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4661
    ObjectType:
      - SAM_USER
      - SAM_GROUP
  selection_object:
    - ObjectName|endswith:
        - "-512"
        - "-502"
        - "-500"
        - "-505"
        - "-519"
        - "-520"
        - "-544"
        - "-551"
        - "-555"
    - ObjectName|contains: admin
  filter:
    SubjectUserName|endswith: $
  condition: selection and selection_object and not filter
falsepositives:
  - If source account name is not an admin then its super suspicious
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 35ba1d85-724d-42a3-889f-2e2362bcaf23
    type: derived

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