Windows Security: Suspicious SAMTHEADMIN-* Computer/Account Names Ending with $

Alerts on Windows Security events with computer account names starting SAMTHEADMIN- and ending with $.

FreeReviewedSigma · Critical · v2
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
elhoim (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2022-09-09
Updated
2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows Security events where a computer or related account name starts with "SAMTHEADMIN-" and ends with "$". Such naming patterns can indicate automated or hacktool-generated account creation, which attackers may use for initial access, persistence, privilege escalation, or stealth. It relies on telemetry fields that include SamAccountName and TargetUserName from Windows Security logging.

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Windows Security: Suspicious SAMTHEADMIN-* Computer/Account Names Ending with $
Pivot detection · T1078 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
  1. v2
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  2. v1
    No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.