Windows Service Creation for KrbRelayUp (KrbSCM)

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1543Create or Modify System Process
Priv Esc
- T1543Create or Modify System Process
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies Windows service creation events for the service name "KrbSCM", indicating use of the KrbRelayUp tool for establishing a new service on a domain-connected host. Attackers may use this persistence and privilege-escalation technique when environments do not enforce LDAP signing. Detection relies on Windows Service Control Manager telemetry, specifically Event ID 7045 capturing service installation details.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Service Creation for KrbRelayUp (KrbSCM)

Pivot detection · T1543 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-service-creation-for-krbscm-via-krbrelayup-tool-e97d9903

title: Windows Service Creation for KrbRelayUp (KrbSCM)
id: 21556ad4-4557-40f6-a66e-452140e48d78
status: test
description: This rule identifies Windows service creation events for the service name "KrbSCM", indicating use of the KrbRelayUp tool for establishing a new service on a domain-connected host. Attackers may use this persistence and privilege-escalation technique when environments do not enforce LDAP signing. Detection relies on Windows Service Control Manager telemetry, specifically Event ID 7045 capturing service installation details.
references:
  - https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/service_control_manager/win_system_krbrelayup_service_installation.yml
author: Sittikorn S, Tim Shelton, Huntrule Team
date: 2022-05-11
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1543
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: system
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 7045
    ServiceName: KrbSCM
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: e97d9903-53b2-41fc-8cb9-889ed4093e80
    type: derived

Convert

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