Windows Service Installation with Suspicious ProgramData/Root Executable Image Paths
Flags Windows service installs (Event 7045) that reference suspicious EXE paths in ProgramData or directly under C:\.
- Product
- windows
- Service
- system
- Author
- pH-T (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-03-18
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Persistence → Priv EscRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows service creation events from the Service Control Manager (EventID 7045) where the service executable path matches suspicious patterns rooted in ProgramData or the filesystem root. Attackers may use services for persistence or privilege escalation by pointing a new service to an unexpected executable location. Detection relies on Windows service installation telemetry, specifically the ImagePath value reported in Event 7045, and applies regex checks to identify the anomalous path formats.
Reporting behind it
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows Service Installation with Suspicious ProgramData/Root Executable Image Paths
id: fd37403b-2202-475d-8906-3d8b8ebd3130
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows service creation events from the Service Control Manager (EventID 7045) where the service executable path matches suspicious patterns rooted in ProgramData or the filesystem root. Attackers may use services for persistence or privilege escalation by pointing a new service to an unexpected executable location. Detection relies on Windows service installation telemetry, specifically the ImagePath value reported in Event 7045, and applies regex checks to identify the anomalous path formats.
references:
- Internal Research
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/service_control_manager/win_system_susp_service_installation_folder_pattern.yml
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-03-18
modified: 2022-03-24
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- car.2013-09-005
- attack.t1543.003
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection_eid:
Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
EventID: 7045
selection_img_paths:
- ImagePath|re: ^[Cc]:\\[Pp]rogram[Dd]ata\\.{1,9}\.exe
- ImagePath|re: ^[Cc]:\\.{1,9}\.exe
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 1b2ae822-6fe1-43ba-aa7c-d1a3b3d1d5f2
type: derived