Windows: Suspicious Process Spawn by Outlook Parent

Alerts on Windows process launches where Outlook.exe spawns known high-risk command execution binaries.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v1

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Michael Haag, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Elastic, FPT.EagleEye Team (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2022-02-28
Updated: 2026-07-30

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1204.002Malicious File
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows process creation events where the parent process is Outlook.exe and the child process is one of several commonly abused executables (for example, PowerShell, MSHTA, regsvr32, wmic, and scheduled task utilities). Such parent/child relationships are important because attackers frequently leverage Outlook to start execution chains that run scripts, downloaders, or other payload components. It relies on process creation telemetry with parent and image file paths captured in fields like ParentImage and Image, including process names identified by their filename suffixes.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1204.002 — drag to rearrange

Suspicious HijackLoader Component Execution via ClearFake

Malicious Silent AteraAgent RMM Installation via IntegratorLogin

Suspicious Windows Script Host Execution of JavaScript from Temporary Archive Extraction Folder (via process_creation)

Suspicious PowerShell Launched by MSIX StartingScriptWrapper From WindowsApps via Process Creation (via process_creation)

Suspicious PowerShell Remote TXT Payload Download Spawned by Shortcut via LNK (via process_creation)

Suspicious Script Interpreter Spawned by OneNote via Embedded Attachment (via process_creation)

Suspicious ClickFix Command Execution via RunMRU Registry Key

Suspicious Base64 Bash Execution via nohup on macOS via ClickFix (via process_creation)

Suspicious PowerShell Download Spawned From Explorer via ClickFix (via process_creation)

Windows: Suspicious Process Spawn by Outlook Parent

Pivot detection · T1204.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-suspicious-process-spawn-by-outlook-parent-208748f7

title: "Windows: Suspicious Process Spawn by Outlook Parent"
id: 0ef42c8e-5d44-4461-8b8b-31d0af7ffcad
related:
  - id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50
    type: derived
  - id: e212d415-0e93-435f-9e1a-f29005bb4723
    type: derived
  - id: 208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creation events where the parent process is Outlook.exe and the child process is one of several commonly abused executables (for example, PowerShell, MSHTA, regsvr32, wmic, and scheduled task utilities). Such parent/child relationships are important because attackers frequently leverage Outlook to start execution chains that run scripts, downloaders, or other payload components. It relies on process creation telemetry with parent and image file paths captured in fields like ParentImage and Image, including process names identified by their filename suffixes.
references:
  - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/465aabe132ccb949e75b8ab9c5bda36d80cf2fd503d52b8bad54e295f28bbc21?environmentId=100
  - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_office_outlook_susp_child_processes.yml
author: Michael Haag, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Elastic, FPT.EagleEye Team, Huntrule Team
date: 2022-02-28
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ParentImage|endswith: \OUTLOOK.EXE
    Image|endswith:
      - \AppVLP.exe
      - \bash.exe
      - \cmd.exe
      - \cscript.exe
      - \forfiles.exe
      - \hh.exe
      - \mftrace.exe
      - \msbuild.exe
      - \msdt.exe
      - \mshta.exe
      - \msiexec.exe
      - \powershell.exe
      - \pwsh.exe
      - \regsvr32.exe
      - \schtasks.exe
      - \scrcons.exe
      - \scriptrunner.exe
      - \sh.exe
      - \svchost.exe
      - \wmic.exe
      - \wscript.exe
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1

Convert

This rule as a query you can run. Uses no unlock credit.

SplunkSPL