Windows Security: Suspicious Remote Logon Using Explicit Credentials via Command-Line Tools

Flags EventID 4648 remote logons initiated by cmd/PowerShell/winrs/wmic/net/reg-style processes using explicit credentials.

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v2

Product: windows
Service: security
Author: oscd.community, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, Zach Stanford @svch0st, Tim Shelton (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2020-10-05
Updated: 2026-07-31

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
- T1078Valid Accounts
Execution
Persistence
- T1078Valid Accounts
Priv Esc
- T1078Valid Accounts
Defense Evasion
- T1078Valid Accounts
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies Windows Event ID 4648 instances where a remote logon occurs using explicit credentials and the initiating process is a command-line or administrative utility (cmd.exe, PowerShell, winrs, wmic, net, net1, reg). Such activity matters because attackers often use credential-based remote execution or management tools to establish lateral movement while hiding their origin. The rule relies on Windows Security auditing telemetry for process name context in Event 4648, and filters out localhost targets and service/machine accounts ending with '$'.

Reporting behind it

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Malicious Network Login Performed to Multiple Targets (via security)

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Windows Security: Suspicious Remote Logon Using Explicit Credentials via Command-Line Tools

Pivot detection · T1078 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-suspicious-remote-logon-using-explicit-credentials-941e5c45

title: "Windows Security: Suspicious Remote Logon Using Explicit Credentials via Command-Line Tools"
id: a3610b8c-a464-46fb-a132-10adf03836d5
status: test
description: This rule identifies Windows Event ID 4648 instances where a remote logon occurs using explicit credentials and the initiating process is a command-line or administrative utility (cmd.exe, PowerShell, winrs, wmic, net, net1, reg). Such activity matters because attackers often use credential-based remote execution or management tools to establish lateral movement while hiding their origin. The rule relies on Windows Security auditing telemetry for process name context in Event 4648, and filters out localhost targets and service/machine accounts ending with '$'.
references:
  - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_logon_explicit_credentials.yml
author: oscd.community, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, Zach Stanford @svch0st, Tim Shelton, Huntrule Team
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2022-08-03
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1078
  - attack.lateral-movement
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4648
    ProcessName|endswith:
      - \cmd.exe
      - \powershell.exe
      - \pwsh.exe
      - \winrs.exe
      - \wmic.exe
      - \net.exe
      - \net1.exe
      - \reg.exe
  filter1:
    TargetServerName: localhost
  filter2:
    SubjectUserName|endswith: $
    TargetUserName|endswith: $
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
  - Administrators that use the RunAS command or scheduled tasks
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 941e5c45-cda7-4864-8cea-bbb7458d194a
    type: derived

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