Windows Sysmon DNS Query to .onion or Tor Gateway Domains
Alerts when Windows Sysmon DNS queries target .onion or Tor gateway/proxy-related domain suffixes.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- dns_query
- Author
- frack113 (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-02-20
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
C2Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags DNS queries where the queried name ends with .onion, .hiddenservice.net, .onion.* TLDs, Tor gateway subdomains (s1–s5.tor-gateways.de), or tor2web/torlink domains. Attackers may use these domains to reach Tor-hidden services or related routing/proxy infrastructure, making DNS lookups a valuable early signal for command-and-control and evasion. It relies on Windows Sysmon DNS query telemetry, specifically the QueryName field ending with the listed patterns.
Reporting behind it
- logpoint.comhttps://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/detecting-tor-use-with-logpoint/
- github.comhttps://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/f99542b94afe0ad2f19a82cc08262e7ac8e1428e/Detections/ASimDNS/imDNS_TorProxies.yaml
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_tor_onion_domain_query.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows Sysmon DNS Query to .onion or Tor Gateway Domains
id: 251185c0-8dc7-4f56-b3e7-3bb452345a13
related:
- id: 8384bd26-bde6-4da9-8e5d-4174a7a47ca2
type: similar
- id: a8322756-015c-42e7-afb1-436e85ed3ff5
type: similar
- id: b55ca2a3-7cff-4dda-8bdd-c7bfa63bf544
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags DNS queries where the queried name ends with .onion, .hiddenservice.net, .onion.* TLDs, Tor gateway subdomains (s1–s5.tor-gateways.de), or tor2web/torlink domains. Attackers may use these domains to reach Tor-hidden services or related routing/proxy infrastructure, making DNS lookups a valuable early signal for command-and-control and evasion. It relies on Windows Sysmon DNS query telemetry, specifically the QueryName field ending with the listed patterns.
references:
- https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/detecting-tor-use-with-logpoint/
- https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/f99542b94afe0ad2f19a82cc08262e7ac8e1428e/Detections/ASimDNS/imDNS_TorProxies.yaml
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_tor_onion_domain_query.yml
author: frack113, Huntrule Team
date: 2022-02-20
modified: 2025-09-12
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090.003
logsource:
product: windows
category: dns_query
detection:
selection:
QueryName|endswith:
- .hiddenservice.net
- .onion.ca
- .onion.cab
- .onion.casa
- .onion.city
- .onion.direct
- .onion.dog
- .onion.glass
- .onion.gq
- .onion.ink
- .onion.it
- .onion.link
- .onion.lt
- .onion.lu
- .onion.nu
- .onion.pet
- .onion.plus
- .onion.rip
- .onion.sh
- .onion.to
- .onion.top
- .onion
- .s1.tor-gateways.de
- .s2.tor-gateways.de
- .s3.tor-gateways.de
- .s4.tor-gateways.de
- .s5.tor-gateways.de
- .t2w.pw
- .tor2web.ae.org
- .tor2web.blutmagie.de
- .tor2web.com
- .tor2web.fi
- .tor2web.io
- .tor2web.org
- .tor2web.xyz
- .torlink.co
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1