Windows Process Creation: Sysmon.exe as Parent of Spawned Process

Alerts when Sysmon.exe/Sysmon64.exe is the parent of a new process, a potentially suspicious execution chain on Windows.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v5

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton (fp werfault) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2022-11-10
Updated: 2026-07-31

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows process creation events where the parent process image is Sysmon.exe or Sysmon64.exe, indicating Sysmon is spawning another process. Such parent-child behavior can be abused during exploitation or post-exploitation activity to run attacker-controlled processes under the context of Sysmon. It relies on process creation telemetry that includes ParentImage and Image paths and applies exclusions for temporary and common crash-related Sysmon/related utility executions.

Reporting behind it

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Malicious Kerberos proxiable/S4U2self Ticket - CVE-2021-42278/42287 (via security)

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Windows Process Creation: Sysmon.exe as Parent of Spawned Process

Pivot detection · T1068 · 9 related

Changelog

v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-sysmon-process-creation-where-sysmon-spawned-a-child-process-6d1058a4

title: "Windows Process Creation: Sysmon.exe as Parent of Spawned Process"
id: 03ef263c-bdca-4d0e-81d7-050cc44911d2
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creation events where the parent process image is Sysmon.exe or Sysmon64.exe, indicating Sysmon is spawning another process. Such parent-child behavior can be abused during exploitation or post-exploitation activity to run attacker-controlled processes under the context of Sysmon. It relies on process creation telemetry that includes ParentImage and Image paths and applies exclusions for temporary and common crash-related Sysmon/related utility executions.
references:
  - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-41120
  - https://twitter.com/filip_dragovic/status/1590052248260055041
  - https://twitter.com/filip_dragovic/status/1590104354727436290
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2022/Exploits/CVE-2022-41120/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2022_41120_sysmon_eop.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton (fp werfault), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-11-10
modified: 2025-07-04
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1068
  - cve.2022-41120
  - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - \Sysmon.exe
      - \Sysmon64.exe
  filter_main_temp_sysmon:
    Image|startswith: C:\Users\
    Image|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\
    Image|endswith:
      - \Sysmon.exe
      - \Sysmon64.exe
  filter_main_generic:
    Image|contains:
      - :\Windows\Sysmon.exe
      - :\Windows\Sysmon64.exe
      - :\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
      - :\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe
      - :\Windows\System32\WerFaultSecure.exe
      - :\Windows\System32\wevtutil.exe
      - :\Windows\SysWOW64\wevtutil.exe
  filter_main_null:
    Image: null
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 6d1058a4-407e-4f3a-a144-1968c11dc5c3
    type: derived

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