Windows UAC Bypass via consent.exe and werfault.exe with comctl32.dll-related behavior

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1548.002Bypass User Account Control
Defense Evasion
- T1548.002Bypass User Account Control
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags process creation where a parent process ending with '\consent.exe' launches a child ending with '\werfault.exe' under high/system integrity contexts. Such behavior can indicate an attempt to bypass UAC by leveraging consent flows and related common controls components. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, specifically parent/child image paths and the reported integrity level of the executing process.

Reporting behind it

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Windows UAC Bypass via consent.exe and werfault.exe with comctl32.dll-related behavior

Pivot detection · T1548.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-uac-bypass-via-consent-exe-and-werfault-exe-with-comctl32-dll-related-be-1ca6bd18

title: Windows UAC Bypass via consent.exe and werfault.exe with comctl32.dll-related behavior
id: b00f11d7-e54d-4c8b-9c6f-7a307dcc2e24
status: test
description: This rule flags process creation where a parent process ending with '\consent.exe' launches a child ending with '\werfault.exe' under high/system integrity contexts. Such behavior can indicate an attempt to bypass UAC by leveraging consent flows and related common controls components. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, specifically parent/child image paths and the reported integrity level of the executing process.
references:
  - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_consent_comctl32.yml
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ParentImage|endswith: \consent.exe
    Image|endswith: \werfault.exe
    IntegrityLevel:
      - High
      - System
      - S-1-16-16384
      - S-1-16-12288
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 1ca6bd18-0ba0-44ca-851c-92ed89a61085
    type: derived

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