Windows WFP 5157: Connection Blocked for EDR Agent Binaries

ATT&CK techniques

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows Security log EventID 5157 where a Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) blocked a connection initiated or associated with a set of common EDR agent binaries. Attackers can impair defensive visibility by leveraging WFP filtering to prevent EDR components from communicating or reporting. The detection relies on Windows Security audit events for Filtering Platform Connection and process name matching for known EDR agent executables.

Reporting behind it

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Windows WFP 5157: Connection Blocked for EDR Agent Binaries

Pivot detection · T1685 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-wfp-blocked-connection-involving-edr-agent-binaries-bacf58c6

title: "Windows WFP 5157: Connection Blocked for EDR Agent Binaries"
id: 8271e2e7-e6ff-42ab-825c-2930ddb57b64
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows Security log EventID 5157 where a Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) blocked a connection initiated or associated with a set of common EDR agent binaries. Attackers can impair defensive visibility by leveraging WFP filtering to prevent EDR components from communicating or reporting. The detection relies on Windows Security audit events for Filtering Platform Connection and process name matching for known EDR agent executables.
references:
  - https://github.com/netero1010/EDRSilencer
  - https://github.com/amjcyber/EDRNoiseMaker
  - https://ghoulsec.medium.com/misc-series-4-forensics-on-edrsilencer-events-428b20b3f983
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/object_access/win_security_wfp_endpoint_agent_blocked.yml
author: "@gott_cyber, Huntrule Team"
date: 2024-01-08
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1685
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
  definition: "Requirements: Audit Filtering Platform Connection needs to be enabled"
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5157
    Application|endswith:
      - \AmSvc.exe
      - \cb.exe
      - \CETASvc.exe
      - \CNTAoSMgr.exe
      - \CrAmTray.exe
      - \CrsSvc.exe
      - \CSFalconContainer.exe
      - \CSFalconService.exe
      - \CybereasonAV.exe
      - \CylanceSvc.exe
      - \cyserver.exe
      - \CyveraService.exe
      - \CyvrFsFlt.exe
      - \EIConnector.exe
      - \elastic-agent.exe
      - \elastic-endpoint.exe
      - \EndpointBasecamp.exe
      - \ExecutionPreventionSvc.exe
      - \filebeat.exe
      - \fortiedr.exe
      - \hmpalert.exe
      - \hurukai.exe
      - \LogProcessorService.exe
      - \mcsagent.exe
      - \mcsclient.exe
      - \MsMpEng.exe
      - \MsSense.exe
      - \Ntrtscan.exe
      - \PccNTMon.exe
      - \QualysAgent.exe
      - \RepMgr.exe
      - \RepUtils.exe
      - \RepUx.exe
      - \RepWAV.exe
      - \RepWSC.exe
      - \sedservice.exe
      - \SenseCncProxy.exe
      - \SenseIR.exe
      - \SenseNdr.exe
      - \SenseSampleUploader.exe
      - \SentinelAgent.exe
      - \SentinelAgentWorker.exe
      - \SentinelBrowserNativeHost.exe
      - \SentinelHelperService.exe
      - \SentinelServiceHost.exe
      - \SentinelStaticEngine.exe
      - \SentinelStaticEngineScanner.exe
      - \sfc.exe
      - \sophos ui.exe
      - \sophosfilescanner.exe
      - \sophosfs.exe
      - \sophoshealth.exe
      - \sophosips.exe
      - \sophosLivequeryservice.exe
      - \sophosnetfilter.exe
      - \sophosntpservice.exe
      - \sophososquery.exe
      - \sspservice.exe
      - \TaniumClient.exe
      - \TaniumCX.exe
      - \TaniumDetectEngine.exe
      - \TMBMSRV.exe
      - \TmCCSF.exe
      - \TmListen.exe
      - \TmWSCSvc.exe
      - \Traps.exe
      - \winlogbeat.exe
      - \WSCommunicator.exe
      - \xagt.exe
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unlikely
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: bacf58c6-e199-4040-a94f-95dea0f1e45a
    type: derived

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