Windows: WinRing0 Driver Load via Image Hash and File Name Match

Alerts on Windows driver loads matching WinRing0 modules by IMPhash or expected WinRing0 filenames.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2

Product: windows
Category: driver_load
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2022-07-26
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1543.003Windows Service
Priv Esc
- T1543.003Windows Service
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags the loading of WinRing0 driver binaries when the loaded image matches a specific imphash and the filename ends with common WinRing0 variants. Loading these drivers can enable attackers to gain low-level access for persistence or privilege escalation. It relies on Windows driver load telemetry that includes image hash (imphash) and the loaded image path or filename.

Reporting behind it

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Windows: WinRing0 Driver Load via Image Hash and File Name Match

Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-winring0-driver-load-via-imphash-or-image-path-match-1a42dfa6

title: "Windows: WinRing0 Driver Load via Image Hash and File Name Match"
id: fd7dc47a-c9a9-44b3-87a6-33d7eac2641e
status: test
description: This rule flags the loading of WinRing0 driver binaries when the loaded image matches a specific imphash and the filename ends with common WinRing0 variants. Loading these drivers can enable attackers to gain low-level access for persistence or privilege escalation. It relies on Windows driver load telemetry that includes image hash (imphash) and the loaded image path or filename.
references:
  - https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig/tree/master/bin/WinRing0
  - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/12/13/driver-based-attacks-past-and-present/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/driver_load/driver_load_win_vuln_winring0_driver.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-07-26
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: driver_load
detection:
  selection:
    - Hashes|contains: IMPHASH=D41FA95D4642DC981F10DE36F4DC8CD7
    - ImageLoaded|endswith:
        - \WinRing0x64.sys
        - \WinRing0.sys
        - \WinRing0.dll
        - \WinRing0x64.dll
        - \winring00x64.sys
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 1a42dfa6-6cb2-4df9-9b48-295be477e835
    type: derived

Convert

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