Windows WMI Event Consumer (scrcons.exe) Creates Named Pipe

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1047Windows Management Instrumentation
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule matches when the WMI Event Consumer process scrcons.exe is observed creating a named pipe. Attackers may leverage WMI event consumers to execute or stage activity via inter-process communication, so named pipe creation tied to this binary can be a useful indicator. The detection relies on Windows telemetry that records named pipe creation events and includes the creating process image path.

Reporting behind it

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Windows WMI Event Consumer (scrcons.exe) Creates Named Pipe

Pivot detection · T1047 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-wmi-event-consumer-scrcons-exe-created-named-pipe-493fb4ab

title: Windows WMI Event Consumer (scrcons.exe) Creates Named Pipe
id: ca357b0d-1338-40e4-a9db-7aa6bb8a1e84
status: test
description: This rule matches when the WMI Event Consumer process scrcons.exe is observed creating a named pipe. Attackers may leverage WMI event consumers to execute or stage activity via inter-process communication, so named pipe creation tied to this binary can be a useful indicator. The detection relies on Windows telemetry that records named pipe creation events and includes the creating process image path.
references:
  - https://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/LiquidSnake
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_scrcons_wmi_consumer_namedpipe.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-09-01
modified: 2023-11-30
tags:
  - attack.t1047
  - attack.execution
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: pipe_created
  definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith: \scrcons.exe
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 493fb4ab-cdcc-4c4f-818c-0e363bd1e4bb
    type: derived

Convert

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