Windows WMIC process creation with suspicious command execution
Alerts on WMIC spawning new processes with command-line indicators of common execution/payload binaries on Windows.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2020-10-12
- Updated
- 2026-07-30
ATT&CK techniques
ExecutionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows process creation events where the command line includes WMIC-style process creation patterns and invokes secondary execution targets such as rundll32, regsvr32, bitsadmin, PowerShell/pwsh, certutil, and script hosts. Attackers abuse WMIC to indirectly spawn processes for execution and payload staging while blending into legitimate administration tooling. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, specifically the process command line contents captured at event time.
Reporting behind it
- thedfirreport.comhttps://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/
- symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.comhttps://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_susp_process_creation.yml
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows WMIC process creation with suspicious command execution
id: 55eca7bb-9b2e-416b-bfb6-a561ac9943d5
related:
- id: 526be59f-a573-4eea-b5f7-f0973207634d
type: derived
- id: 3c89a1e8-0fba-449e-8f1b-8409d6267ec8
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creation events where the command line includes WMIC-style process creation patterns and invokes secondary execution targets such as rundll32, regsvr32, bitsadmin, PowerShell/pwsh, certutil, and script hosts. Attackers abuse WMIC to indirectly spawn processes for execution and payload staging while blending into legitimate administration tooling. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, specifically the process command line contents captured at event time.
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/
- https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_susp_process_creation.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1047
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- "process "
- "call "
- "create "
CommandLine|contains:
- rundll32
- bitsadmin
- regsvr32
- "cmd.exe /c "
- "cmd.exe /k "
- "cmd.exe /r "
- "cmd /c "
- "cmd /k "
- "cmd /r "
- powershell
- pwsh
- certutil
- cscript
- wscript
- mshta
- \Users\Public\
- \Windows\Temp\
- \AppData\Local\
- "%temp%"
- "%tmp%"
- "%ProgramData%"
- "%appdata%"
- "%comspec%"
- "%localappdata%"
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
simulation:
- type: atomic red team
name: WMI Execute rundll32
technique: T1047
atomic_guid: 00738d2a-4651-4d76-adf2-c43a41dfb243
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_susp_process_creation/info.yml
license: DRL-1.1