ZOHOMURK Non-Browser Zoho and IPFetcher User-Agents (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-14
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the hardcoded Zoho client and IPFetcher user-agent strings used by the ZOHOMURK implant when abusing Zoho WorkDrive and ipinfo.io during the Mustang Panda campaign. Adversaries reuse these non-browser agent strings for OAuth, folder enumeration and external IP discovery. Because legitimate Zoho software does not emit these exact tokens, the agents provide a reliable channel indicator.

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ZOHOMURK Non-Browser Zoho and IPFetcher User-Agents (via proxy)
Pivot detection · T1567.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.