Sigma detection rules, expert-reviewed
Each one is checked against the reporting it came from before it is published, and shows the ATT&CK technique it covers, the telemetry it needs and where it falls short.
6,094 rules
Malicious Service Creation for DcRAT Persistence via sc.exe (via process_creation)
This rule detects use of sc.exe to create the MixedSvc service pointing at a masqueraded Mixed Reality.exe binary under the Windows Media Player folder, the persistence mechanism used by Operation DragonReturn to survive reboots. The actor abused Windows service control to auto-start its DcRAT loader with SYSTEM privileges, making this a high-value chokepoint for catching the intrusion before code injection into svchost.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh213Premium2026-05-07Malicious Eldorado Ransomware Ransom Note Creation
This rule detects the creation of the HOW_RETURN_YOUR_DATA.TXT ransom note dropped by Eldorado ransomware across encrypted directories. The note appears once encryption completes and delivers the extortion demand. It matters because its widespread creation confirms an active Eldorado impact event on the host or shares.
HuntRule TeamWindowsfile_eventHigh534Premium2026-05-07Malicious MoustachedBouncer Service DLL Hijack of WmdmPmSp via Registry (via registry_set)
This rule detects modification of the legitimate WmdmPmSp service ServiceDll value to point at the malicious creh.dll, a persistence method used by the MoustachedBouncer toolset. Hijacking an existing service DLL lets the implant run inside a trusted svchost process and survive reboots.
HuntRule TeamWindowsregistry_setHigh163Premium2026-05-07Malicious Defender Real-Time Monitoring Disabled by The Gentlemen RaaS (via process_creation)
This rule detects Set-MpPreference invoked to disable Microsoft Defender real-time monitoring, a defense-evasion step used by The Gentlemen ransomware operators before deploying tooling. Turning off real-time protection lets subsequent payloads run unimpeded. Catching this reveals active tampering with endpoint defenses.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh4710Premium2026-05-06Suspicious Python Execution Spawned from Batch and Script Chain
This rule detects python.exe launched by a command interpreter that was itself started from a batch or PowerShell parent, matching the BAT to PowerShell to CMD to python execution tree of the Snake Python infostealer. Attackers use this chained launcher to unpack and run the Python stealer while blending into scripted activity. The interpreter-to-python lineage highlights the malware execution flow.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationLow123Premium2026-05-06Malicious RDP Shadow Session Started - Command (via process_creation)
This rule detects would attempt to shadow a RDP session.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh182Premium2026-05-06Malicious PowerShell Download Cradle From GitHub Raw (via process_creation)
This rule detects a PowerShell download cradle that pipes an Invoke-WebRequest against raw.githubusercontent into Invoke-Expression. Phantom Goblin uses this to fetch and execute its Go-compiled stealer binaries.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh153Premium2026-05-06Malicious SharpGPOAbuse GPO Modification Tool from Public Directory
This rule detects execution of the SharpGPOAbuse tool renamed to gpo.exe from the C:\Users\Public directory during a CrazyHunter ransomware intrusion. The attacker abuses Group Policy to push ransomware components domain-wide, so an unsigned GPO manipulation binary launched from a world-writable path signals defense evasion and preparation for mass deployment.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh272Premium2026-05-06Malicious Event Log Clearing via Wevtutil
This rule detects wevtutil clearing Windows event logs, an anti-forensics action used to erase traces of intrusion activity. This was observed during KawaLocker ransomware deployment alongside firewall and shadow copy tampering. Wiping logs removes the primary evidence responders use to trace attacker actions.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh316Premium2026-05-06Suspicious DNS Tunneling With Hex Subdomain To info Domain (via dns_query)
This rule detects DNS queries to info domains whose leftmost label is a long hexadecimal string, the encoding CoinLoader uses to tunnel data and receive commands over DNS TXT records. High-entropy hex subdomains under a single parent domain are a strong signal of DNS tunneling rather than normal name resolution.
HuntRule TeamWindowsdns_queryMedium131Premium2026-05-06Suspicious MSBuild LOLBin Spawning Script Interpreter (via process_creation)
This rule detects MSBuild.exe spawning PowerShell or cmd child processes which indicates inline task code execution abused as a signed binary proxy. Legitimate build automation rarely has MSBuild directly launching interactive script interpreters.
—Windowsprocess_creationMedium171Premium2026-05-06Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution Of DLL From User Writable Path via Process Creation
This rule detects regsvr32.exe registering a DLL located in a user-writable directory such as Temp or AppData. Emotet drops its payload DLL into a temporary folder and executes it through regsvr32 to proxy execution and evade application controls, a pattern uncommon for legitimate software.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium183Premium2026-05-06Suspicious SMB MaxMpxCt Registry Tuning (via registry_set)
This rule detects modification of the LanmanServer MaxMpxCt registry value, which Repellent Scorpius raises to increase the number of concurrent SMB commands and accelerate lateral movement and ransomware distribution. Tuning this value is uncommon outside of specialized administration and often precedes mass network encryption.
HuntRule TeamWindowsregistry_setMedium151Premium2026-05-06Malicious PowerShell Download Rename and Execute Chain via Script Block
This rule detects a PowerShell script block that downloads a file into the public directory with Invoke-WebRequest, renames it to an executable with Rename-Item, and launches it with Start-Process. RomCom uses this exact chain after its Firefox and Windows zero-day exploitation to stage and run its backdoor. This indicates scripted payload delivery following exploitation.
HuntRule TeamWindowsps_scriptHigh456Premium2026-05-06Suspicious conhost Headless Execution for Hidden Window
This rule detects conhost launched with the --headless flag which suppresses the console window, a defense evasion technique seen in ACR Stealer intrusion chains. Hiding the console window conceals attacker command execution from the user during infostealer activity.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium251Premium2026-05-06