Malicious Direct etcd Write to Kubernetes Registry via ETCDCTL_API (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-18
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects direct writes to the Kubernetes object store held in etcd by invoking etcdctl v3 against the /registry key space. Attackers who compromise etcd use this to inject privileged pods or hidden namespace resources that never pass through the kube-apiserver. Bypassing the API server evades admission controllers and audit logging while granting node and cluster takeover.

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Suspicious Privileged or Host Namespace Kubernetes Pod Creation
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Malicious Direct etcd Write to Kubernetes Registry via ETCDCTL_API (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1611 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.