Malicious Direct etcd Write to Kubernetes Registry via ETCDCTL_API (via process_creation)
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- HuntRule
- Published
- 2026-06-18
- Updated
- 2026-08-28
ATT&CK techniques
Execution → Priv EscRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule detects direct writes to the Kubernetes object store held in etcd by invoking etcdctl v3 against the /registry key space. Attackers who compromise etcd use this to inject privileged pods or hidden namespace resources that never pass through the kube-apiserver. Bypassing the API server evades admission controllers and audit logging while granting node and cluster takeover.
Reporting behind it
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
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