Non-privileged reg.exe or PowerShell registry service configuration changes on Windows
Flags non-admin reg.exe or PowerShell activity targeting service registry configuration paths on Windows.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Ryan Plas (rule), oscd.community (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2020-10-05
- Updated
- 2026-07-30
ATT&CK techniques
Persistence → Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule identifies process executions by non-privileged users running reg.exe or PowerShell commands that include service-related registry paths. It matters because modifying service configuration can enable persistence or interfere with defenses without needing elevated privileges. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, including command line content and integrity level indicators (Medium or S-1-16-8192).
Reporting behind it
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Non-privileged reg.exe or PowerShell registry service configuration changes on Windows
id: 55e858ac-570e-46c6-85f0-edf04101d1a9
status: test
description: This rule identifies process executions by non-privileged users running reg.exe or PowerShell commands that include service-related registry paths. It matters because modifying service configuration can enable persistence or interfere with defenses without needing elevated privileges. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, including command line content and integrity level indicators (Medium or S-1-16-8192).
references:
- https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment-20-638.jpg
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_non_priv_reg_or_ps.yml
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Ryan Plas (rule), oscd.community, Huntrule Team
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1112
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_cli:
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- "reg "
- add
- CommandLine|contains:
- powershell
- set-itemproperty
- " sp "
- new-itemproperty
selection_data:
IntegrityLevel:
- Medium
- S-1-16-8192
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ControlSet
- Services
CommandLine|contains:
- ImagePath
- FailureCommand
- ServiceDLL
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 8f02c935-effe-45b3-8fc9-ef8696a9e41d
type: derived