Non-privileged reg.exe or PowerShell registry service configuration changes on Windows

Flags non-admin reg.exe or PowerShell activity targeting service registry configuration paths on Windows.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v1

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Ryan Plas (rule), oscd.community (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2020-10-05
Updated: 2026-07-30

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1112Modify Registry
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1112Modify Registry
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies process executions by non-privileged users running reg.exe or PowerShell commands that include service-related registry paths. It matters because modifying service configuration can enable persistence or interfere with defenses without needing elevated privileges. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, including command line content and integrity level indicators (Medium or S-1-16-8192).

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1112 — drag to rearrange

Malicious Enabling of Restricted Admin Mode via Registry by UAT-8837

Suspicious Enabling of Remote Desktop via fDenyTSConnections Registry by DeadLock Ransomware

Malicious Service DLL Hijack for Persistence via Lotus Blossom

Suspicious Loopback Proxy Server Configured via Registry (via registry_set)

Malicious WDigest Credential Caching Enabled via Registry (via registry_set)

Suspicious Remote Desktop Enabled via fDenyTSConnections Registry by Sandworm

Malicious Gh0stBins RAT Registry Marker HHClient

Suspicious PebbleDash C2 Configuration Stored Under WMI Security Key (via registry_set)

Suspicious WDigest UseLogonCredential Enablement for Plaintext Credential Theft (via registry_set)

Non-privileged reg.exe or PowerShell registry service configuration changes on Windows

Pivot detection · T1112 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

non-privileged-reg-exe-or-powershell-registry-service-configuration-changes-on-w-8f02c935

title: Non-privileged reg.exe or PowerShell registry service configuration changes on Windows
id: 55e858ac-570e-46c6-85f0-edf04101d1a9
status: test
description: This rule identifies process executions by non-privileged users running reg.exe or PowerShell commands that include service-related registry paths. It matters because modifying service configuration can enable persistence or interfere with defenses without needing elevated privileges. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, including command line content and integrity level indicators (Medium or S-1-16-8192).
references:
  - https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment-20-638.jpg
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_non_priv_reg_or_ps.yml
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Ryan Plas (rule), oscd.community, Huntrule Team
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1112
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_cli:
    - CommandLine|contains|all:
        - "reg "
        - add
    - CommandLine|contains:
        - powershell
        - set-itemproperty
        - " sp "
        - new-itemproperty
  selection_data:
    IntegrityLevel:
      - Medium
      - S-1-16-8192
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - ControlSet
      - Services
    CommandLine|contains:
      - ImagePath
      - FailureCommand
      - ServiceDLL
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 8f02c935-effe-45b3-8fc9-ef8696a9e41d
    type: derived

Convert

This rule as a query you can run. Uses no unlock credit.

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